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Abstract  
 
This study explores the use of personal pronouns in the context of political 
agitation on Twitter in the run-up to the EU referendum 2016. Using a 
combination of corpus linguistic and discourse analytical techniques, it shows 
notable differences in the way in which personal pronouns were employed by 
Leavers and Remainers. In particular, we emerged as a significant factor 
distinguishing the online rhetoric of the two camps with Leavers using we 
more often and in a much more versatile manner. This study contributes to 
the growing body of research on ambient affiliations in political 
communication offering insights into the ways in which personal pronouns 
are strategically deployed to create imagined collectives for the purpose of 
political bonding and agitation online.  
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1 Introduction  
 
Brexit has been one of the major political events in modern British history. In 
the EU Referendum held on 23 June 2016, the Leave campaign won over the 
pro-European Remain campaign with a narrow majority of 51.9%. Much of 
the Leavers’ success has been attributed to populist rhetoric fuelled by the 
fear of immigration, economic losses and strong nationalist sentiments. While 
this rhetoric undoubtedly played an important role in swaying the public 
opinion towards Brexit, some commentators argue that it was not just 
economic inequality or concerns over immigration but a wider range of issues 
pertaining to values and identities that motivated the Leavers (Kaufmann 
2016).  
Similar to other political events such as the Arab Spring or Occupy 
Movement, social media sites, Twitter in particular, have been considered 
influential and consequential in swaying public opinion during the run-up to 
the EU referendum (Grčar et al. 2017). Researchers in political and 
computational sciences see contents of tweets as mirrors of public attitudes 
and political sentiments, and hail Twitter as a predictor of election results 
(Grčar et al. 2017; Di Fatta et al. 2016; Tumasjan et al. 2010). Not just the 
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content of messages sent on Twitter is important; its affordance to reach large 
and diverse audiences, the portability and replicability of messages (boyd 
2011) and the possibility of establishing and strengthening socio-emotional 
relationships, or what Zappavigna (2014) calls a communion of feeling, makes 
Twitter a particularly useful tool for political agitation, which very much 
depends on creating affiliations and allegiances (Fetzer and Bull 2008).  
Despite the significance of Twitter in political campaigning 
(Papacharissi 2015; Jungherr 2014), linguistic practices of networked 
bonding around political issues have to date received less attention (but see 
Coesemans and De Cock 2017; Sadler 2017). Linguistic devices for identity 
construction in political communication, specifically devices such as personal 
pronouns and metaphors used to construct in- and out-groups, have been 
extensively investigated under the methodological umbrella of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA), but most of this research has been concerned with 
offline texts and practices (Musolff 2015; Baker et al. 2008; Charteris-Black 
2004; Wodak et al. 1999). Although the distinction between offline and online 
is blurred, mobile technologies do come with certain affordances and 
constraints that shape the ways in which political identities can be constructed 
and communicated. The broadcastability and accessibility of Twitter allows 
for communication with large audiences in a short spell of time without any 
delays caused by editorial boards or other authoritarian bodies. At the same 
time, the word limit of 140 characters (increased to 280 in 2017) requires 
users to use this space economically, condensing tweets into key messages 
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(Coesemans and De Cock 2017). The shortness of messages and their mostly 
episodic, bullet point-like style (chronicling of events and sharing 
information) (Humphreys et al. 2013) means that the typical cohesive flow of 
written texts established through the use of anaphora and cataphora is absent. 
The resultant contextual absences can instil referential ambiguity, for 
example, in our understanding of personal pronouns and what or who they 
stand for. Sometimes this ambiguity could be rhetorically useful in that it 
could appeal to diverse audiences (Fetzer and Bull 2008) and multiple 
audiences characterise communication on social media sites such as Twitter1. 
Other times, tweeters might offer specific contextualisation cues to make sure 
that a particular identity is meant and not another.  
The focus of this study is on the use of personal pronouns in the 
context of political agitation on Twitter. Studying the use of personal 
pronouns in political communication is significant for at least three reasons: 
Personal pronouns are the paramount linguistic devices of indexicality used 
to refer to the self and other(s); they act as important tools of signalling and 
maintaining individual or group membership; and greater use of personal 
pronouns, especially first and second person pronouns, is considered 
indicative of an involved style, whereas lesser use of these devices points to 
a nominal and impersonal style (Biber and Conrad 2009). Because political 
                                                 
1 In fact, the presence of multiple and specified audiences makes it impossible to know 
precisely who receives a message posted on Twitter – something which Marwick and boyd 
(2010) call context collapse. 
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campaigns build strongly on involvement to create affiliations and 
allegiances, the extent to which personal pronouns are deployed could 
indicate on the one hand the degree of involvement, and on the other hand the 
strategies of in- and out-grouping. Some personal pronouns that index 
identities, specifically we and they, are ambiguous and fuzzy in that they can 
simultaneously refer to multiple entities or identities hidden in the nouns or 
noun phrases for which they stand (Kleinke and Bös 2018; Fetzer and Bull 
2008). This ambiguity makes them useful strategic devices in political 
communication allowing politicians to divert attention from themselves, to 
shift responsibilities, or to strengthen allegiances when necessary.  
This study, therefore, explores the use of personal pronouns in the 
context of political agitation on Twitter in the run-up to the EU referendum. 
It is particularly interested in demonstrating the extent and types of personal 
pronouns used by Leavers and Remainers on Twitter to gauge the degree of 
involvement with ambient audiences. Given that some pronouns have a dual 
function, for example, we can include or exclude depending on the context, 
this study explores in more detail the specific kind of affiliations and 
memberships that influential tweets produced by the two camps evoke 
through the use of we.  
Influential tweets in our study are tweets that were produced by 
politicians, public figures and political organisations affiliated with or 
representing either the Leave or Remain campaign and that were retweeted at 
least 100 times. This study contributes to the growing body of research on 
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networked identities and imagined collectives (boyd 2011) showing the ways 
in which personal pronouns are strategically deployed to create imagined 
collectives for the purpose of political bonding and agitation online. 
 
 
2 The role of pronouns in political persuasion   
 
Personal pronouns are the paramount linguistic devices used to refer to the 
self or the other, often in replacement of a noun or noun phrase to which they 
can be anaphorically or cataphorically traced (Quirk et al. 1985). Although 
the relationship between pronouns and the noun or noun phrase for which 
they stand is grammatically straightforward, the actual use of personal 
pronouns in discourse is not always so clear cut (Fetzer and Bull 2008). With 
the exception of I which is unambiguous, other first and second person 
pronouns have a wide referential range and flexibility (Pavlidou 2014). For 
example, the first person plural we can refer to just a speaker and listener (I 
and you) but also extend to larger groups or identity memberships such as a 
political party, a government, a country or the whole of humanity (Pavlidou 
2014). Quirk et al. (1985) identify eight special uses of we including the self-
referential we, the generic we, the inclusive authorial we, the editorial we, the 
rhetorical we, we in reference to the hearer, in reference to a third party, and 
the rarely used royal we. Mühlhäusler and Harré (1990) classify the referential 
meanings of we into two groups: inclusive we referring to speaker, hearer and 
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possibly some other people, and exclusive we including references to a group 
of people including the speaker but excluding the hearer (the authorial we, the 
editorial we and the royal we).     
The polyvalent character of some personal pronouns makes them 
convenient rhetorical devices in political spheres, which depend on 
affiliations and are inherently driven by in- and out-grouping (Fetzer 2014). 
Pronouns can be useful for asserting allegiances and drawing boundaries 
between groups (us vs. them). Equally, they can signal inclusiveness and be 
strategically used to appeal to larger audiences. We in particular has been 
shown to be a strategic tool of constructing, reconstructing and deconstructing 
collectivity (Fetzer 2014).   
A great deal of attention has been dedicated to pronouns in studies 
investigating discursive representations of marginalised groups, specifically 
immigrants and ethnic minorities.  In the field of CDA, there is now a large 
body of research documenting diverse linguistic strategies of othering, often 
underpinned by specific uses of pronouns. For example, Wodak et al. (1999) 
show how in right-wing agitation in Austria, the plural we was strategically 
used to refer to one particular national identity (Austrians), while ethnic 
minorities were referred to with a vague impersonal they without making 
clear to which group they actually belonged. Similar trends have been 
established in nationalist propaganda found in other national and political 
contexts including the UK, Germany, Russia, and Poland.  
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The differentiated use of personal pronouns is not only restricted to 
right-wing or extremist propaganda; politicians across the board use pronouns 
manipulatively for political effects. For example, Wilson has shown how 
pronominal references can be strategically used to divert attention from a 
political persona, while De Fina (1995) demonstrates how in a self-
promotional manner they can help present a speaker as an active agent. In 
more recent studies, Fetzer and Bull (2008) investigate the use of pronouns 
in political interviews and show how pronominal shifts (for example, from 
you to we and vice versa) can be used as a means of both over- and under-
inclusion and as devices of evasion to discursively wriggle out of difficult 
questions. Analysing a panel discussion about Europe’s future in the context 
of the 2008 annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, Cramer (2010) 
explores pronouns as tools of indexing Europeanness. The study shows how, 
for example, the inclusive we is used to construct European identity and 
alignment with European values and beliefs.  
Given the rhetorical usefulness of pronouns, it is not surprising that 
they are a salient feature of political communication. Tyrkkö (2016) 
investigates quantitatively the use of personal pronouns in 875 political 
speeches delivered since the early 19th century. The diachronic analysis shows 
a significant rise in the use of personal pronouns over the last two centuries. 
Specifically, the self-referential plural pronouns we, us, and our increased 
quite dramatically, whereas references to the self (I, me and mine) 
experienced a substantial reduction. The author argues that this change 
325 
 
reflects a shift from a person-centred rhetoric to a more group-centred style 
brought about by wider changes in democratic societies, dislike for political 
self-promotion, and the development of broadcast and technology. 
Interestingly, a rise of references to the other has been observed at least since 
the early 20th century, suggesting a stronger tendency for exclusiveness 
through in- and out-grouping.  
The vast majority of studies concerned with the use of pronouns in 
political contexts examined a variety of offline contexts, whereas increasingly 
important online communication has received little attention. A recent study 
by Coesemans and De Cock (2017) presents the first important contribution 
to our understanding of the use of pronominal references in the context of 
political microblogging. Studying tweets produced by Belgian and Spanish 
politicians during the 2014 European elections campaign, the authors identify 
several communicative practices that politicians adopt and adapt in order to 
increase their online visibility and influence. First, the authors notice a 
prominent use of self-references through first person pronouns. Second, 
through retweets, hashtags, and Twitter handles, politicians also use third 
person means to refer to themselves. The authors conclude that in the studied 
contexts politicians have shown a heightened awareness of the affordances 
and constraints of Twitter and adapted their communicative strategies 
accordingly. They utilised the platform not just for political messaging but as 
a tool for personal and professional branding, reflecting a more person-
centred style, rather than the group-centred style observed in political 
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speeches in the study by Tyrkkö (2016). Thus, it seems that communication 
on social media sites such as Twitter ‘encourages’ politicians to be more self-
centred. Yet, it must be noted that the politicians whose tweets were analysed 
by Coesemans and De Cock (2017) were individuals competing for seats in 
the European parliament and thus self-presentation played an important part 
in this contest. This might not be the same in the context of collective actions 
such as the Leave and Remain campaigns. Against this background, this paper 
endeavours to address the following research questions:  
1) Which personal pronouns were utilised in influential Leave and 
Remain tweets and to what extent?  
2) Does the use of personal pronouns in influential Leave and Remain 
tweets pertain to a more person- or group-centred style? 
3) What kind of identities and memberships did influential Leave and 
Remain tweets draw on to mobilise voters?             
Whereas the first two questions are answered using a quantitative corpus-
based methodology, specifically adopting the framework proposed by Tyrkkö 
(2016), the third question draws on qualitative discourse-analytical 
techniques used in previous research on the use of pronouns in political 
communication (e.g. Fetzer and Bull 2008). The next section outlines in detail 
the data collection procedures and methods used to conduct this study.     
 
3 Data and methods  
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The data under investigation comprises two corpora consisting of 1,456 
Leave tweets (30,302 words) and 1,458 Remain tweets (35,691 words) 
respectively, which were retweeted in the run-up to the EU referendum. They 
were compiled from two sources of tweets. The first set of tweets was 
collected from the Twitter API platform between 20 February and 22 July 
2016. All tweets posted during this period which include one of the keywords 
Brexit, EU, referendum, voteleave, or votestay were collected in real time. In 
total, 55,551,810 tweets were collected. The data was initially used for a 
larger project investigating the influence of Twitter on the Brexit vote. As the 
focus of this study is on identity politics with a wider reach, we filtered the 
large dataset for only those tweets that we deemed influential for the current 
study.  
There are three main ways in which influence on Twitter can be 
measured: 1) by the number of followers indicating the size of a user’s 
audience, 2) by the number of mentions of the user indicating her or his ability 
to engage in conversation with other users, and 3) by the number of retweets 
indicating the ability of the user to write content of interest that is widely 
disseminated (Grčar et al. 2017). Since we were not interested in the influence 
of a particular politician but in the creation of networked political affiliations 
and identities by the Leave and Remain campaign, we decided to use the 
number of retweets as a marker of influence. Beyond information diffusion 
to large audiences, retweeting is also an important conversational tool and a 
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means of participation and engagement with others (boyd et al. 2010). What 
is retweeted can be assumed to be an ongoing relevant topic of conversation 
with which audiences engage. Only tweets that were retweeted at least 100 
times were marked as influential, whereas the rest were removed. Each 
remaining tweet was then manually classified as either Remain or Leave 
depending on the known stance of the handle that posted it.  
It is not surprising that most of the influential tweets were tweeted by 
politicians and media institutions such as the BBC or the Daily Mail, with the 
majority coming from politicians’ accounts. This is already an interesting 
result, indicating that views of single people from the street are less likely to 
be widely retweeted on Twitter in the context of political campaigns.  
The set of influential tweets retrieved from the big data pool was small 
and dominated by singular voices (e.g. Boris Johnson, Louise Mensch, Chuka 
Umunna), which we felt did not reflect the whole campaign. Therefore, we 
decided to complement the data set by collecting tweets from MPs on Twitter, 
by utilising a historical archive of all tweets posted by past and present 
Members of Parliament. This constituted the second data set.  
Tweets created between 20 February and 22 July 2016 containing the 
same keywords as above (Brexit, EU, referendum, voteleave, votestay) were 
downloaded from mpsontwitter.co.uk. Tweets which had been retweeted 100 
times were included in the data set. Any duplicates were removed. As above, 
each tweet was then classified as either Remain or Leave depending on the 
known stance of the MP during the timeframe. Tweets from four MPs who 
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had either remained neutral during the campaign or had changed their stance 
on the referendum within our timeframe (as in the case of Sarah Wollaston, 
@sarahwollaston) were discarded. Using regular expressions and Notepad++, 
both sets of tweets were subsequently cleaned by removing URL links and 
converting unwanted html entities (e.g. &amp) to their applicable characters 
(e.g. &). Only the actual tweet texts were analysed including metadata in 
hashtags (#) and mentions (@) that the tweets contained.  
We began our analysis by retrieving all instances of personal pronouns 
from the two corpora, Leave and Remain. When identifying candidates for 
the retrieval, we followed the analytical framework proposed by Tyrkkö 
(2016). Similar to his study, we were interested in personal references as 
markers of identity and therefore included personal pronouns proper (in both 
subject and object position) as well as possessive pronouns. Reflexive 
pronouns were not considered because they tend to be very low frequency 
items. The final set of pronouns included twenty-one items.   
Both corpora were uploaded onto the corpus linguistic software 
programme Sketch Engine (Kilgarriff et al. 2004), which was used to retrieve 
the selected pronouns. Instances in which double meanings were possible 
were subsequently checked manually to resolve ambiguities. For example, all 
instances of us in which us was used as the abbreviation of the United States 
were removed. Similarly, occurrences of non-personal use of they and them 
were also excluded by manually checking the tweets in which the pronouns 
occurred. To identify general trends in the use of personal pronouns, the 
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twenty-one pronouns were subsequently grouped into four main semantic 
categories in accordance with their primary referent – an approach which we 
adopted from Tyrkkö (2016). These include the following categories: 1) 
singular self-references (I, my, me, mine), audience-references (you, your, 
yours), 3) plural self-references (we, us, our, ours), and 4) other-references 
(he, his, him, she, her, hers, they, them, their, theirs). Raw frequencies (RF) 
were retrieved for all twenty-one pronouns and combined in the relevant 
semantic categories. All results were normalised per 1,000 words using the 
following formula: the number of instances of a personal pronoun in a given 
corpus divided by the size of that corpus (in words) and multiplied by 1,000. 
To gauge whether the difference in usage of the pronouns in the two corpora 
was significant, we used the log-likelihood (LL) test available through the 
log-likelihood wizard created at the University of Lancaster2. The LL relies 
on the normalisation procedure based on total corpus size and hence it is well 
suited to deal with large quantities of non-parametric data. It is a good 
measure for testing the significance of differences between token counts of 
specific linguistic features across corpora (Dunning 1993). When reporting 
results, the following standard notation has been used to indicate the level of 
                                                 
2 http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/llwizard.html (accessed 12 August 2018).  
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statistical significance: NS not significant; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
and **** p<0.00013.  
As discussed in the previous section, some personal pronouns in 
English can have a wide referential range and the kind of identities that they 
refer to can only be discerned from investigating in detail the context in which 
they are used. For this reason, the general quantitative insights were expanded 
by a qualitative analysis of the influential tweets. Because the first person 
plural we emerged as a significant distinguishing feature of influential tweets 
produced by Leavers and Remainers, the qualitative analysis focused on the 
use of this pronoun.  
In order to understand what kind of identities we encompassed in the 
context of the Leave and Remain campaign, all influential tweets with the 
pronoun were analysed to identify and code the meaning(s) and identities that 
it evoked. Social actors are described and identified not just through the use 
of nouns and modifiers but also through the actions that they perform or are 
subject to (Van Leeuwen 1995), as well as the objects or effects of the actions. 
                                                 
3 P stands for p-value, also referred to as calculated probability. Conventionally, a 
result is considered significant if it reaches p<0.05 (less than 1 in 20 chance of being 
wrong), which is usually indicated with *. If the p-value is less than 0.01 (p<0.01), 
this is indicated with two stars ** pointing to very significant results; *** are used 
for highly significant results, when the p value is less than 0.001 or **** for 
p<0.0001.  
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For example, in the sentence He beat the hell out of Tom it is the action and 
the modifier of the action that construct he as a violent person who does harm 
to others. Hence, whole tweets including hashtags and mentions were 
scrutinised for cues that evoke we-identities and their qualities.  
The categorisation of the instances of we in the two corpora proceeded 
by applying the categories of meanings of we identified by Mühlhäusler and 
Harré (1990). No instances of exclusive we were identified; only inclusive we 
was used in the data albeit many different groups and memberships were 
evoked, sometimes in one tweet. For example, the following tweet After we 
#VoteLeave, the British people can decide how to spend the £350m we send 
to the EU each week includes two instances of we; the first one is clearly a 
reference to voters in support of Leave (signalled by the use of the hashtag), 
whereas the second we extends this reference to all British people.    
The next section presents first the general trends regarding the use of 
personal pronouns in the corpora of influential Leave and Remain tweets 
identified quantitatively. Subsequently, insights obtained from the qualitative 
analysis of the constructions of we-identities are discussed.         
 
 
4 Results and Discussion 
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Table 1 presents the raw (RF) and normalised frequencies (NF, per 1,000 
words) of the 21 personal pronouns retrieved from the Leave and Remain 
corpora.  
 
Table 1 Raw and normalised frequencies of personal pronouns in influential 
Leave and Remain tweets 
 
Pronoun  
RF 
Leave 
NF 
Leave 
RF 
Remain 
NF 
Remain 
LL P 
I 131 4.3 156 4.4 0.01 NS 
me 59 1.9 31 0.9 14.04 *** 
my 46 1.5 122 3.4 24.35 **** 
mine 1 0.0 1 0.0 0.01  n/a 
you 87 2.9 97 2.7 0.14 NS 
your 45 1.5 41 1.1 1.42 NS 
yours 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.00 n/a  
he 77 2.5 49 1.4 11.70 *** 
him 14 0.5 4 0.1 7.64 ** 
his 59 1.9 29 0.8 15.93 **** 
she 16 0.5 9 0.3 3.30 NS 
her 4 0.1 11 0.3 2.35 NS 
hers 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.00 n/a  
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we 325 10.7 288 8.1 12.39 *** 
us 66 2.2 98 2.7 2.14 NS 
our 161 5.3 159 4.5 2.48 NS 
ours 1 0.0 2 0.1 0.20 NS 
they 79 2.6 68 1.9 3.61 NS 
them 23 0.8 39 1.1 1.97 NS 
their 40 1.3 44 1.2 0.10 NS 
theirs 1 0.0 0 0.0 1.56 n/a  
TOTAL 1235 40.8 1248 35 14.6 *** 
 
Generally speaking, we find more personal pronouns being used in the 
influential tweets produced by Leavers with approximately 41 pronouns per 
1,000 tokens as opposed to Remainers, who used 35 pronouns in every 1,000 
tokens. The difference is significant and could potentially indicate a more 
involved stance (Biber and Conrad 2009) of Leavers’ behaviour on Twitter. 
When we look at the use of specific pronouns, further conspicuous tendencies 
can be observed. For example, both campaigns made frequent references to 
men as indicated by greater use of he, him and his as compared to the female 
references she, her and hers, which were almost absent. This suggests that 
regarding the use of pronominal references, male voices and perspectives 
dominated the influential tweets in the run-up to the EU referendum, 
highlighting a gendered dimension of the campaign. This is perhaps not 
surprising given that in the UK politics is still dominated by men with the 
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female participation being around 30% (one third of all MPs) 4 . The we 
pronoun was used to a significantly different extent by Leavers and 
Remainers; it occupied 10.7 per 1,000 tokens in influential Leave tweets in 
comparison to only 8.0 per 1,000 tokens of Remain’s. This result suggests 
that Leavers relied more on creating a sense of inclusiveness since all 
instances of we in the corpora were examples of inclusive we (see below). 
Conversely, Remainers tended to refer more often to themselves through my, 
which stands out as a frequent feature of the influential tweets produced by 
the Remain camp. This suggests that influential voices supporting the Remain 
campaign were more self-promotional, since my as a possessive refers to 
entities that belong to the speaker (my article, my blog). However, when the 
twenty-one personal pronouns were grouped into semantic categories, the 
difference in the use of singular self-references was less striking. As indicated 
in Table 2, when the frequencies of all singular self-references were 
aggregated, the difference was not significant. What Table 2 supports and 
Figure 1 visualises, though, is a greater use of plural self-references and other-
references in the influential Leave tweets suggesting that the Leave campaign 
was more often speaking on behalf of or for wider communities (Fetzer 2014).   
 
Table 2 Referential categories of personal pronouns in influential Leave and 
Remain tweets 
                                                 
4 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2017-40192060 (accessed 12 August 2018).  
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Pronoun  RF 
Leave 
NF 
Leave 
RF 
Remain 
NF 
Remain 
LL P 
Singular 
Self-Ref. 
237 7.8 310 8.7 1.48 NS 
Plural 
Self-Ref.  
553 18.2 547 15.3 8.37 ** 
Audience 132 4.4 138 3.9 0.96 NS 
Other  313 10.3 253 7.1 19.98 **** 
       
  
 
Figure 1 Referential categories of personal pronouns in influential Leave and 
Remain tweets, normalised per 1,000 words.  
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In general terms, the findings fit the tendencies regarding the use of personal 
pronouns in political speeches observed by Tyrkkö (2016); a greater use of 
plural self-references and other-references and a relatively smaller proportion 
of audience- and singular self-references confirm the shift in political style 
from a more person-centred to a stronger group orientation. Since the use of 
the first person plural we emerged as a significant distinguishing feature of 
the influential tweets produced by Leavers and Remainers, we now turn our 
attention to the use of the pronoun in context.  
Identifying the kind of identities evoked by we in the two corpora 
revealed some striking differences in the ways in which this pronoun was 
employed by the two camps. The Leavers did not only use the pronoun more 
frequently, they used it in a much more versatile manner. Rarely the kind of 
identities that were signalled by we involved anaphora or cataphora referring 
to specific names of groups (e.g. citizens of this country); rather, the identities 
were constructed through the content of the messages including devices such 
as hashtags or @handles that all worked together to discursively evoke a 
particular we-identity. What is more, the messages together with hashtags and 
@handles implied certain evaluative and affective characteristics with which 
the we-identities were then imbued.  
In the corpus of the influential Leave tweets, seven clear Leavers’ 
identities could be identified. These are: disadvantaged people of Britain, 
members of the EU, opponents of established political elites, World War Two 
heroes, advocates of democracy, global citizens and supporters of British 
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families, farmers and consumers. These identities entail diverse memberships 
and can potentially speak to large numbers of audiences, uniting those who 
might not have shared the same political views before the campaign. We 
begin by analysing tweets in which we-identities are constructed on the basis 
of a negative self-presentation.  
An image of disadvantaged British people dominates the self-
presentations. The below tweets (examples 1–5) are indicative examples of 
this construction in our corpus.  
(1) Amount we send to Brussels each week: £350m. Cost to build a new, 
fully staffed NHS hospital: £350m. It’s time to #VoteLeave 
(2) The @EU_Commission bills the UK £350m per week - after 40 
years. Wonder what level it will reach if we suffer another 40 years? 
#VoteLeave 
(3) We do need more money in our public services... imagine what we 
could do with an extra £350m a week... #TakeControl #VoteLeave 
(4) Another great interview @patel4witham @itvnews! £350m 
recognition of money we don’t control! #VoteLeave #TakeControl 
(5) If we #VoteLeave on 23 June we can #TakeControl of the £350m we 
send to the EU every week. 
In these tweets, we has a dual indexicality; it signals the identity of Leave 
voters (If we #VoteLeave) but extends it to all British people who are 
portrayed as being at a disadvantage. The image of the disadvantaged British 
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is not created through concrete naming strategies but through foregrounding 
causal links between policies of the EU and their bad effects on people living 
in Britain. In examples (1) to (5), the amount of £350m is highlighted, which, 
according to the tweeters, Britain contributes to the EU budget per week. This 
claim was put forward by the right-wing populist UK Independence Party 
(UKIP) party and was subsequently discredited as totally inaccurate. 
Nevertheless, the number played an important part in the rhetoric of Leavers 
and was quickly taken up in public discourse. In our corpus, 37 influential 
Leave tweets make reference to this amount and present it as a fact. The we-
identity foregrounded in these tweets is that of people from whom a 
significant amount of money is being taken away (topos of loss) and as a 
result they are disadvantaged because they lose out on vital services like the 
National Health Service (NHS). This makes them weak and lacking control 
(we don’t control, we suffer). The only possible way to stop this suffering and 
to turn the disadvantage into an advantage is to take back control and exit the 
EU. This is emphasised by the use of the two hashtags #VoteLeave5 and 
#TakeControl, which almost always occur at the end of the tweets acting as a 
kind of coda.  
                                                 
5 Vote Leave was the name of the official campaign in favour of leaving the EU 
involving members of parliament from the Conservative and Labour Party as well as 
UKIP. Many members are prominent political figures including Boris Johnson, 
Michael Gove and Gisela Stuart.   
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Coda is an important tool of narrativity which creates a bridge between 
the story world and the present moment and mostly conveys evaluative and 
moral messages (De Fina and Georgakopoulou 2012). The tweets can be 
indeed seen as examples of stories but not the kind of fully-fledged narratives 
studied by Labov and Waletzky (1967) but as instances of digital narrative 
activities which Georgakopoulou (2007) calls small stories. Similar to other 
examples of small stories explored in social media, for example, Facebook 
updates (Page 2012, Georgakopoulou 2014), the tweets analysed in this study 
demonstrate narrativity through explicit references to time, place and events 
and a proposal how the events should be understood and acted upon. The 
latter is mostly evoked in the hashtags at the end acting as codas. In this sense, 
#VoteLeave and #TakeControl are not only the solutions to the outlined 
problems but also moral imperatives and commands for action as signalled 
through the use of the imperative mood. The underlying image of 
disadvantaged people is changed to those who can have agency and be in 
control again (we can #TakeControl) by voting to leave the EU. The hashtags 
also act as a narrative glue in the story of Leave which creates a sense of 
collectivism and ambient bonds between those who are in favour of leaving 
the EU.  
Not surprisingly, another cause of disadvantages is the EU policy of 
free movement, which in the view of those in support of Leave contributes to 
uncontrolled immigration, as shown in examples (6) to (10).    
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(6) @MarkFoxNews Free movement rules while we are in EU means 
permanent, uncontrolled immigration from the EU. #VoteLeave 
(7) If we stay in the EU, with free movement of millions of immigrants, 
our quality of life in Britain will deteriorate. 
(8) Cameron continues to use #ProjectFear to cover up the fact that as a 
member of EU we cannot control immigration #VoteLeave 
(9) The EU’s free movement rule, means we pay EU immigrants £860 
million in benefits. If we remain, this will rocket, along with 
immigration #VoteLeave  
(10) German Islamist terrorist has free movement to the UK. We are 
NOT safer in EU. Controlling our borders makes us safer 
Here we refers mostly to Britain as a member of the EU (we are in EU, a 
member of EU, we stay in the EU), which due to this membership cannot 
control immigration and hence is again portrayed as being disadvantaged. 
This is directly emphasised in examples 7, 9 and 10, in which immigration is 
linked to deterioration of quality of life (our quality of life), terrorism and 
seen as a financial burden (we pay). As example 10 shows, the EU is 
portrayed as not a safe place because it allows free movement of terrorists and 
hence puts Britain in danger. Such portrayals of immigration are archetypal 
for right-wing propaganda and have been documented in a variety of contexts 
(Baker et al. 2008; Wodak et al. 1999). As in the previous examples, most of 
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the tweets finish with #VoteLeave, implying that leaving the EU is the 
solution to the specified problems and the moral imperative.  
One of the facets of the we-identity that emerged in the influential 
Leave tweets is that of dissatisfaction with established political elites, 
specifically with politicians who were in favour of Remain such as David 
Cameron and George Osborne (examples 11–13).  
(11) If we vote to leave we will be needing a new Prime Minister and 
Chancellor so George Osborne will not have a say in any post-
Brexit budget 
(12) George Osborne’s announcement re an ‘emergency budget’ is 
simply a threat to punish voters if we #VoteLeave because it would 
not pass 
(13) #Project Fear becomes Project Threat as Cameron and Osborne 
threaten to lay waste to our economy when we #Brexit 
Examples (11) to (13) project the outcome of the referendum in favour of the 
Leave campaign (if we #VoteLeave), at times with a high degree of certainty 
(when we #Brexit). They also project a future without two political figures, 
the Prime Minister and the Chancellor, who both are constructed as posing a 
threat to the British economy. This argument may have appealed to those who 
might not essentially be against the EU but wished for a change in the 
government.     
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Although the image of the disadvantaged we is prominent in the 
corpus, more often than not the influential Leave tweets project a positive 
image of British people and the country. The tweets in examples (14) to (16) 
are indicative of such positive identity constructions:  
(14) Amazing point by Andrea, we exclude some of the best nurses in 
the world from working in the UK because of the EU #VoteLeave  
(15) Who do we want to be in control? People we elect or EU 
bureaucrats? 
(16) We are the fifth biggest economy in the world – we will prosper 
outside the EU #VoteLeave    
Here the we-identity of Leavers is based on the image of open citizens who 
strive for democracy and global trade but are constrained by the EU. In order 
to break free from these constraints, it is necessary to vote leave. The Leavers 
also self-present as active agents of change (we can, we elect) and supporters 
of British families, farmers and consumers (see examples 17–18). A brave 
new future is projected for these groups after Brexit.       
(17) Michael Gove explains how after we #VoteLeave we can help 
family budgets by cutting VAT on energy bills 
(18) After Brexit we can pay our farmers more direct to promote what 
is best for British agriculture, British consumers; animal welfare 
(19) Gove: After we #VoteLeave we can #TakeControl and spend the 
£350m we send to the EU every week on our priorities 
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Finally, the influential Leave tweets cite voices of those who fought in the 
Second World War and, in doing so, link the Leave campaign with the heroic 
past and fight for freedom (see example 20). Here the we-identity of Leavers 
acquires yet another moral dimension; voting to leave the EU is a moral 
gratitude for the sacrifices of those who fought in WWII.     
(20) WWII Heroes: ‘don't give away what we fought for’ urging voters 
to back Brexit #VoteLeave 
Turning to the corpus of influential Remain tweets, we identified among 
them a smaller range of Remainers’ identities including: the British people, 
Labour party, the opponents of the Conservative party and economists. Most 
of the instances of we refer to Remainers but in the context of leaving since 
the pronoun occurs mostly in the conditional construction if we leave (42 
occurrences). This projects the possibility of leaving the EU (see examples 
21–24), which is rather striking in the context of the Remain campaign.  
(21) IFS said there would be a £20–40b budget black hole if we leave 
by 2019/20 – meaning sharp cuts and tax rises #StrongerIn    
(22) Just spoke to UK CEO of a major US bank who says 2,000 jobs in 
his firm will go to mainland Europe if we leave. The cost of 
BREXIT is real 
(23) Former heads of 
Tesco/Sainsbury’s/M&S/Asda/Waitrose/Morrisons and B&Q 
warn that ‘prices will rise’ if we leave the EU #Strongerin #EUref   
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(24) Excellent by @ChrisLeslieMP on the real economic risks facing us 
if we leave EU #Remain #StrongerIn 
As can be seen in examples (21) to (24), the projection of leaving serves as a 
warning of dire consequences to which Brexit might lead, especially in 
financial terms. It is striking that almost all the instances of the construction 
if we leave are followed or preceded by projections of economic risks 
including job losses, cuts and rising prices, at times emphasised by bringing 
in the voices of economists, as in example (25).  
(25) IFS: Leavers may not like economists, but we are right about dangers 
of BREXIT 
Similar to #VoteLeave and #TakeControl, #StrongerIn acts as a coda but it is 
less of an imperative to vote Remain and rather a form of evaluation of the 
current status. Whereas the influential Leave tweets project the current state 
as negative, blame the EU for it and then hail the exit from the EU as the key 
to a bright new future, the influential Remain tweets present the future after 
Brexit as something to be afraid of, while the benefits of being in the EU are 
rarely emphasised. Against this background it is perhaps not surprising that 
the Remain campaign was branded Project Fear by the Leavers and this 
theme features prominently in the corpus of influential Leave tweets in the 
form of the hashtag #projectfear (206 occurrences).     
Another we-identity identified in the influential Remain tweets is that 
of supporters of the Labour party and opponents of the Conservative wing. 
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As examples (26) to (30) show, this is signalled through the use of the hashtag 
#LabourInForBritain or the description of Brexit as a Tory Brexit:  
(26) To avoid a Tory Brexit we need more Labour voices to save this 
campaign over the next week and a half #remain  
(27) Today we face one of the most important decisions. To protect jobs, 
growth and the economy we must vote to remain in EU 
#LabourInForBritain   
(28) Yeah, because all these Brexit right wing Tories/kippers really 
want to improve workers rights if we leave the EU 
(29) The Labour Party wants to stay in the EU so we can create a real 
social Europe #LabourInForBritain 
Those who speak in these influential Remain tweets align themselves with 
the Labour party and self-present as supporters of workers’ rights and of 
people who are in poverty. This is a potentially difficult alignment given that 
a number of central political figures within the Labour party were in favour 
of Brexit as were many Labour voters. The traditional divide between left and 
right did not cleanly apply to the Brexit vote. In contrast, the Leavers did not 
create allegiances with the Conservative party in their influential tweets and 
instead targeted political figures on both sides who were in favour of 
remaining in the EU. 
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5 Discussion  
 
The quantitative analysis of personal pronouns in the corpora of influential 
Leave and Remain tweets shows a more group-centred style as indicated by 
the prominence of plural self references compared to the other types. This 
suggests that, in this context, creating affiliations and allegiances was 
generally more important than self-promotion and publicising personal 
political goals. Examining the differences between the two camps, it appears 
that a group-centred style was preferred by both camps but emerged as more 
prominent in the influential Leave tweets. Not only did the Leavers use we 
more, they also did so in a much more versatile manner mobilizing diverse 
memberships.  
The qualitative analysis shows that the influential Leave tweets 
exploited the wide referential range of we. While we was used mostly to refer 
to Leave voters, they were speaking on behalf of and for diverse memberships 
of discontent. Not only the British were evoked within this large group; also 
people dissatisfied with political elites or the level of public services, people 
who feel disadvantaged, British families, farmers were all included in the 
campaign messages. Interestingly, allegiances to the established political 
parties were avoided and instead political figures who were in favour of 
Remain singled out and criticised. Although the we-identities foregrounded 
in the Leave tweets were often portrayed as being disadvantaged, which is 
typical for populist rhetoric (Van Kessel and Castelein 2016; Kazin 1995), 
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this was possibly a strategic move to give more weight to the Leave vote, 
since #VoteLeave was often added at the end of the tweet in form of a coda 
signalling that leaving the EU was the only way to turn the identified 
disadvantages into advantages. It also projected audiences who vote to leave 
as agents of change, thus turning them from passive sufferers to those who 
can do good for themselves and their country. Conversely, the influential 
Remain tweets were less persuasive in that a smaller range of we-identities 
could be identified. When we was used as a marker of group identity, rather 
exclusive membership was mobilised (economists) or groups that were 
already divided by the Brexit campaign such as the main political parties.  
Also, and possibly unintentionally, the influential tweets projected the 
possibility of leaving the EU through the frequent use of the construction if 
we leave mostly preceded or followed by outlining a negative outcome, for 
example, there would be a £20–40b budget black hole if we leave. Although 
the use of if implies a hypothetical scenario, nevertheless it introduces the 
possibility of leaving the EU and doomsday-like events that will affect the 
population at large as indicated by the inclusive we as in if we leave. Thus, 
not leaving the EU is legitimised through the strategy of scaremongering. On 
the contrary, the Leavers often presented Brexit as a done deal (after we 
#VoteLeave, when we #Brexit), which was mostly preceded or followed by 
positive outcomes as in after we #VoteLeave we can help family budgets. 
Thus, leaving the EU was premised and legitimised through an optimistic 
outlook suggested not as a hypothetical scenario but as a real prospect.  
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Essentially what such constructions do is to create a sense of hope for 
the discontented people, who were included in the influential tweets. They 
conjure a kind of feel good experience. The plea to #VoteLeave is not just a 
mobilisation to take political action and vote to leave the EU, it is a vote for 
a supposedly better future. Giving prominence to hope and a better future is 
a rhetorical theme that has been employed by many successful politicians, 
including the former president of the USA Barak Obama (e.g. Clayton 2007). 
Thus, the rhetoric of hope is not essentially a trait of a conservative or liberal 
stance. It is a powerful theme that is employed across the political spectrum 
to mobilise and persuade voters. Its persuasive power lies in the potential to 
generate enthusiasm, which, as shown in experimental studies on political 
campaigning, can increase interest and bolster voters (Brader 2006). Hope 
was conspicuously absent from the influential tweets produced by the 
Remainers which seemed to be dominated by fearful scenarios. Fear too is a 
powerful emotion that has been shown to persuade voters in that it can 
increase their responsiveness. Yet, it can also create some dissonance (Brader 
2006).               
While it would be too simplistic to assume a causal link between the 
use of personal pronouns in influential tweets and the political success of the 
Brexit campaign, the way in which the Leave campaign used personal 
references on Twitter, specifically we, points to a more involved and 
persuasive style. Strengthened by the rhetoric of hope, this persuasive style 
could have appealed to, engaged, and connected publics that were not on the 
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same political wave before the EU referendum, for example both 
Conservative and Labour voters.   
Although this study points to salient uses of personal pronouns as 
rhetorical devices to mobilise political support, it is based on a small set of 
tweets collected just before the referendum, and generalisations beyond this 
sample cannot be made. Also, this study analysed in depth the use of just one 
pronoun, and, although we appears to be a significant distinguishing factor in 
the rhetoric of the two camps, examining other personal pronouns as well as 
other linguistic devices such as metaphors could offer further valuable 
insights into the ways in which collective identities are imagined on Twitter 
and how these imagined collectives are exploited for the purpose of political 
agitation online.           
 
 
6 Outlook   
 
The analysis of the two corpora of influential Leave and Remain tweets has 
shown that, similar to political communication offline (e.g. Tyrkkö 2016), 
political campaigning on Twitter adopts a group-centred style to mobilise 
voters and build support. Messages that were retweeted at least 100 times 
prior to the EU Referendum demonstrated more involvement as reflected in 
greater use of inclusive pronouns and fewer self-promotional ones. The 
politicians and organisations from whose accounts the tweets were originally 
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sent demonstrated a great deal of awareness concerning the affordances and 
constraints of Twitter. Specifically, the constraint of 140 characters was 
strategically exploited by crafting simple messages centred on one key 
pointusing devices such as hashtags to reinforce a point, offer an evaluation 
or include an imperative to take action, and create affiliations around the two 
main campaigns, #VoteLeave and #StrongerIn.  
In his analysis of the use of Twitter as a narrative tool for political 
campaigning, Sadler (2017) makes the point that Twitter does not require the 
development of wholly new literacies. At the same time, he argues that the 
site demands higher interpretative skills; readers are presented with short 
factual messages en masse that they need to mentally order, classify, link to 
events, question, etc. The question arises: to what extent do audiences actually 
engage with high level interpretation? After all, the messages are short, with 
the use of personal pronouns, specifically we, reinforcing the understanding 
that the messages are facts that affect us all (we send, we pay, we don’t 
control). In doing so, we gives the messages personal appeal and legitimacy, 
which many might not see as in need of questioning. In this sense, the 
constraint of Twitter’s word limit seems a useful affordance for political 
persuasion, especially the kind used in a populist style (Moffitt 2016). In his 
seminal analysis of populist persuasion in the history of the USA, Kazin 
(1996) shows that the language of populists, whether on the right or left of 
the political spectrum, is mostly based on simple, hortatory and repetitive 
messages with few complex elaborations. Twitter’s affordance to reach wider 
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audiences, most notably common people, and the word limit that does not 
leave much space for complex explanations or elaborations indeed makes 
Twitter a good medium for populist performances (Moffitt 2016).  
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